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FORMAL, CATEGORICAL, BUT
INCOMPLETE: THE NEED FOR A NEW
STANDARD IN EVALUATING PRIOR
CONVICTIONS UNDER THE ARMED
CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
KRYSTLE LAMPRECHT*
Legislative history indicates that the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), which provides for increased sentences for offenders who have
three qualifying prior convictions, was intended to be applied narrowly to
the smallest possible subset of offenders qualifying as "career criminals."
Any prior conviction must satisfy both a substantive elements requirement
and a sentencing requirement. Courts have established a standard for only
one of these-the substantive elements requirement. In an attempt to
narrow the scope of qualifying prior convictions and ensure national
uniformity of application, the Supreme Court has provided a 'formal
categorical" approach to evaluating prior convictions. This test compares
the substantive elements that were proven to a jury in a previous conviction
to the elements of the generic offense. While this approach has resulted in
greater uniformity in application of ACCA, in the two decades since its
establishment, the formal categorical approach has failed to result in either
the nationwide consistency or the narrowing of ACCA's scope that
Congress and the courts have intended. An equivalent test for the other
requirement a prior conviction must meet-that the underlying conduct
constitute a crime "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year "-would solve many of the problems currently plaguing ACCA. This
standard should discount any sentencing enhancements previously applied
to prior convictions and would allow consistent evaluation of convictions at
the national level, independent of variance in state law. A single,
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2009; B.S., Illinois
Institute of Technology, 2005.
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nationally-uniform source of sentencing guidelines could come from
national averages of the sentence ranges currently existing in the criminal
codes of most states, or from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. This
uniform approach to the sentencing requirement would allow courts to
apply ACCA's requirements on a national level consistently and with a
narrow scope-reducing disproportionality in sentencing, increasing the
deterrent effectiveness of ACCA, and accomplishing Congress's goal of
selective incapacitation of the worst, most unrehabilitative of career
criminals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even simple, objective arithmetic becomes tainted with subjectivity
when the exercise of discretion governs what is counted. An examination
of the current application of the Armed Career Criminal Act,1 which
imposes an enhanced penalty for defendants having at least three prior
qualifying convictions, reveals a number of troubling issues regarding the
evaluation of such prior convictions. These issues include inconsistency in
and among states as to which crimes qualify as predicate offenses and a
generally overbroad interpretation of ACCA's predicate conviction
requirements. Such problems result in disproportionate sentences,
2
categorization of non-violent or non-repeat offenders as "violent career
criminals, '3 reduced effectiveness of ACCA as a deterrent device, 4 and
contravention of Congress's express intent that ACCA be read as narrowly
as possible.
Although Congress has narrowed the scope of ACCA, and although
courts have attempted to construct a formal categorical approach to
evaluating prior convictions in order to eliminate these problems, neither
remedy has entirely solved the problem. In the two decades since its
establishment, the formal categorical approach to ACCA's substantive
elements requirement for prior convictions has failed to result in either the
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).
2 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 19 (2003) (affirming a sentence of twenty-
five-years-to-life imprisonment for theft of golf clubs).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding defendant to
have a criminal "career" consisting of theft of lobster tails from a grocery store, verbal threat
to a security guard, and convictions for drunk driving); see also Beverly G. Dyer, Revising
Criminal History: Model Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4.1-4.2, 18 FED. SENT'G. REP. 373, 376
(June 2006) ("[ACCA] has been used to sweep in far too many crimes that present a
relatively remote risk of the use of physical force or physical injury.").
4 Stephen R. Sady, ACCA Lessons: The Armed Career Criminal Act-What's Wrong with
"Three Strikes, You're Out"?, 7 FED. SENT'G. REP. 69, 70 (1994) ("The [ACCA] can strike
like a lightning bolt, rather than serve as a rational deterrent.").
5 See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of ACCA).
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nationwide consistency or the reduction of ACCA's applicability that
Congress and the courts have intended.
Some courts have implied these continued problems indicate that
ACCA as currently written is inherently flawed and requires legislative
correction. 6 However, ACCA already includes a two-pronged test for the
evaluation of prior convictions: any prior conviction must satisfy both a
substantive elements requirement and a sentencing requirement. Courts
have established a standard for only one of the two prongs-the substantive
elements requirement.7
A uniform, generic standard for application of the sentencing
requirement would solve many of the problems currently plaguing ACCA.
This standard should discount any sentencing enhancements previously
applied to prior convictions and should allow consistent evaluation of
convictions at the national level, independent of variance in state law.
Unlike the formal categorical approach to the substantive elements
requirement, which takes its generic definitions of offenses from the
common law, a formal approach to the sentencing requirement requires a
uniform source of sentencing guidelines, as no common law sentences exist
for most crimes.8 This single, uniform source could come from national
averages of the sentence ranges currently existing in the criminal codes of
most states, or from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. 9 In either
case, this source would allow courts to apply ACCA's requirements on a
national level consistently and with a narrow scope-reducing
disproportionality in sentencing, increasing the deterrent effectiveness of
ACCA, and accomplishing Congress's goal of selective incapacitation of
the worst, most unrehabilitative of career criminals.
II. BACKGROUND
First enacted in 1984, the Armed Career Criminal Act subjects
individuals convicted of illegal possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)1° and having three or more qualifying prior convictions to a
minimum sentence of fifteen years and a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment. Congress modified the scope of qualifying convictions by
6 United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 84 (1st Cir. 2007).
7 See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
8 See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 874 & n.41 (2000)
(describing Massachusetts law in the early nineteenth century: "Excepting only those very
serious crimes that carried mandatory life or death sentences, none of the typical common-
law offenses called for a minimum sentence").
9 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1 (2007).
0 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (prohibiting convicted felons from possessing a firearm).
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amending ACCA in 1986 and 1988.1" Additionally, while ACCA originally
made such sentences mandatory, in United States v. Booker the Supreme
Court declared mandatory minimum sentences unconstitutional under the
Sixth Amendment, making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory. 2
In its current form, ACCA provides in relevant part:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three
previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different
from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less
than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not
suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect
to the conviction under section 922(g). 13
ACCA defines "violent felony" as a "crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile
delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive
device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if
committed by an adult[.]"' 4  Qualifying crimes are burglary, arson,
extortion, or any crime involving "conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another" or that "has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another[.]"'
15
Like other statutes targeting recidivists, ACCA has come under fire
from critics challenging the constitutionality of the use of prior convictions
II The 1986 amendment, enacted as part of the Career Criminal Amendment Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 459 (Supp. IV 1986) expands the range of qualifying
convictions to include any "violent felony or serious drug offense." The 1988 amendment,
part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4462
(1988), restricts the scope of qualifying prior convictions by requiring that each of the three
prior convictions be based on "distinct" criminal episodes. Derrick D. Crago, Note, The
Problem of Counting to Three Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 1179, 1182 (1991). The latter amendment inserted the phrase that the three convictions
must have been 'committed on occasions different from one another."' Id. at 1185. For
discussion of the significance of the 1988 narrowing of the range of qualifying convictions,
see infra note 37 and accompanying text.
12 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) (finding that "'the Sixth
Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a
prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant"' and such
mandatory sentencing provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18
U.S.C. § 3551 (1984), are "effectively advisory." (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (No. 04-104), pt. I)).
13 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000).
14 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
15 Id.
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in determining acceptable punishment for later convictions.16 Despite such
criticisms, however, courts have uniformly held that ACCA complies with
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy, due process, cruel and
unusual punishment, and disproportionality.1 7 The critical component of
the argument for the constitutionality of ACCA and similar recidivism
statutes is that the sentencing enhancements qualify as a "sentencing factor"
rather than an element of a separate substantive offense, which would have
to be proven before a jury.1 8
Even assuming ACCA satisfies all constitutional requirements, current
application of this statute has led to results inconsistent with the
congressional intent behind its enactment. The purpose of ACCA was to
provide enhanced penalties for recidivism, with habitual ("career")
criminals who had proven resistant to all previous efforts to curb their
repeat offending the intended targets.19 Evidence that "a small number of
repeat offenders commit a highly disproportionate amount of the violent
crime plaguing America today" served as a primary motivation for the
legislation.20 The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee emphasized the
narrow application of ACCA to only "the hard core of career criminals[J"
stating that only a "very small portion" of convictions for the enumerated
16 Double jeopardy concerns arise out of the fear that recidivism statutes, such as ACCA,
punish a defendant once when she is actually convicted of the crime, and again for the same
crime when she is convicted of a subsequent crime. See generally Nathan H. Seltzer, Note,
When the Tail Wags the Dog: The Collision Course Between Recidivism Statutes and the
Double Jeopardy Clause, 83 B.U. L. REv. 921 (2004) (focusing on California's "three
strikes" law, addressing disproportionality of sentencing, Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment concerns, and double jeopardy). However, despite these concerns,
courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of recidivism-enhanced-sentencing
statutes. See infra notes 24-26.
17 See United States v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210, 1214 (1 1th Cir. 2000), cert denied, 531
U.S. 1000 (2000) ("[Elvery circuit to consider the issue has held that [ACCA's mandatory
minimum sentence] is neither disproportionate ... nor cruel and unusual punishment.");
United States v. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that ACCA does not
violate Double Jeopardy Clause), reh'g denied, No. 89-1541SI, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS
16482 (8th Cir. Nov. 1, 1989); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 1987)
(finding that ACCA does not violate Equal Protection Clause), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833
(1987); United States v. Greene, 810 F.2d 999, 1000 (11 th Cir. 1986) (finding that ACCA
does not constitute an ex post facto law), post-conviction proceeding, 880 F.2d 1299 (11 th
Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 888 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1018
(1990).
18 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 236 (1998) (finding recidivism
to be a sentencing factor rather than an element of a separate offense); see also In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged.").
19 See infra discussion accompanying notes 32-39.
20 S. REP. No. 97-585, at 3, 20 (1982).
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offenses would receive enhanced sentences under ACCA and stressing that
the bill "focus[ed] on the very worst robberies, by the very worst offenders
with the worst records."
2 1
However, despite these many manifestations of congressional intent
with respect to the applicability of ACCA, courts continue to interpret
ACCA's requirements for prior convictions broadly, resulting in
punishments that seem absurd at best and unconstitutionally
disproportionate or in violation of principles of fundamental fairness at
22worst. Furthermore, despite the 1988 amendment narrowing the range of
applicable prior convictions, critics of ACCA and its current application
continue to be perplexed by the broad range of criminal convictions that
courts declare "violent felonies," and by the vastly increased punishments
arising as a result of such classifications.
III. DISCUSSION
A. EMPHASIS ON A "LAST-CHANCE" APPROACH
Based on empirical data regarding the prediction of recidivism and the
efficacy of rehabilitation, the label of career criminal should be reserved for
the smallest possible subset of offenders. In addition to providing the best
chance that ACCA will achieve its ultimate goal of reducing recidivism, a
narrow interpretation calms fears of constitutionality regarding the
proportionality of sentence to crime and is in line with Congress's manifest
intention.
1. Recidivism as a Basis for Increased Sentences
Consideration of a defendant's prior criminal history has long been a
part of American jurisprudence, "dat[ing] back to colonial times., 24 Today,
recidivism statutes exist in all fifty states. 25 The Supreme Court has held
that such statutes do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy, drawing the distinction between heightened penalties for the most
recent offense based upon the offender's repeated criminal conduct (which
21 Id. at 62-63.
22 See infra note 43 and accompanying discussion and examples.
23 See generally United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1989) (adopting the
approach that the three prior convictions should be required to have originated out of
separate, distinct criminal episodes, and, additionally, that each conviction and sentence
must have been delivered and served prior to the conduct leading to each subsequent
conviction, in an attempt to further narrow the class of criminals whose prior convictions
qualify them for recidivism sentencing enhancements under ACCA).
24 Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992).
25 Parke, 506 U.S. at 26.
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is how the Court views recidivism sentencing enhancements) and additional
punishment for the previous crime (which the Court rejects as the
motivation for recidivism sentence enhancements).26 Nonetheless, critics
continue to question the constitutionality of such provisions. The results
reached under a broad interpretation of ACCA call into question not only
whether Congress's intent is served, but also whether such broad
application effectively serves any theory of punishment.
Critics argue that the disproportionality of the recidivism-enhanced
sentence to the instant crime is impermissibly large, meaning not only that
the instant crime on its own does not justify such a large punishment, but
also that the court is re-punishing the defendant for prior conduct. Further
evidence of double jeopardy violations is that sentencing enhancements,
like those available under ACCA, can often seem to "substantially
overshadow[] the underlying punishment. 2 7
These concerns emphasize the need for rigorous scrutiny of whether
specific prior convictions qualify for sentence enhancement purposes. A
narrow construction of qualifying convictions reduces the likelihood that
courts will routinely aggregate past convictions and reach absurd results.28
If courts do not utilize aggregations of relatively minor convictions to
achieve sentences that are grossly in excess of the maximum sentence for
those minor convictions themselves, then criminals will be more likely to
have the full opportunity for rehabilitation. As a result, ACCA will be
viewed less as fundamentally unfair and random, and more as an effective
deterrent.
26 Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995); see Graham v. West Virginia, 224
U.S. 616, 629 (1912) (explaining that the rationale for this distinction is that recidivism
"does not relate to the commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment only, and
therefore... may be subsequently decided."); see also Seltzer, supra note 16, at 933
(discussing the Court's analysis in Witte).
27 Seltzer, supra note 16, at 935-36 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), as an
example). For a discussion of disproportionate results, see infra notes 68-87 and
accompanying text; see also Seltzer, supra note 16, at 946 (arguing that no clear rationale
exists for the continued assertion that sentencing enhancements for recidivism do not violate
double jeopardy, as the distinction between a sentencing factor and a separate offense is
unclear). While some recidivism statutes undoubtedly do not violate double jeopardy, at
some point, "the underlying conviction cannot bear the weight of the sentence." Id.
28 See infra notes 68-87 and accompanying text (discussing how prior convictions for
minor offenses being used to enhance sentences to ACCA range results in sentences that
seem fundamentally unfair, both in terms of the underlying conduct of the instant offense
and when considering both the instant offense and the recidivism factor).
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2. Categorization of Defendants as Career Criminals: A Narrow Approach
Evidence suggests that enhanced sentences for recidivism may in
general decrease its overall occurrence.29 This is logical, given the widely
accepted axiom that a relatively small group of individuals commit a
disproportionate share of crimes. 30 A problem arises, however, when courts
apply recidivism sentence enhancements to a broader spectrum of criminals
than is necessary to achieve the goals of those enhancements. Furthermore,
an overly broad application of ACCA's enhancements has led to
inefficacious results.3 '
In addition to evidence that a broad interpretation of ACCA reduces its
efficacy at deterring recidivism, legislative history suggests that the authors
of ACCA intended for only the most hardened criminals to fall under its
enhancement provisions. Influenced by the recommendation of the
National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals of the "need
to incarcerate unrehabilitative repeat violent felons for lengthy periods,
32
and by Professor M. Wolfgang's study of repeat juvenile offenders,33
"[ACCA] was intended to supplement the States' law enforcement efforts
against 'career' criminals.,
34
Congress's intent to deter repeat offenders and selectively incapacitate
only those few who remained undeterred and immune to rehabilitative
efforts is clear from legislators' descriptions and justifications for the bill.
The underlying rationale was that a habitual criminal statute serves:
29 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY
COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 14 (May 2004), available at
www.ussc.gov/publicat/RecidivismGeneral.pdf [hereinafter MEASURING RECIDIVISM]
(discussing the relationship between sentence length and recidivism) ("The overall trend
shows that recidivism has an 'inverted U' shape. Recidivism is comparatively low for the
lowest sentences.., peaks with mid-length sentences... then drops for the longest
sentences.").
30 See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 88 (1972)
(finding that, using a sample of 10,000 young males born in Philadelphia in 1945 and
examining the criminal conduct committed by that sample, a very small subset (18%) of that
group committed over half (51.9%) of the group's criminal offenses); see also supra note 20
and accompanying text.
31 Sentencing categories under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines show that sentences
received under ACCA are of a magnitude typically requiring much higher levels of past
recidivism for non-ACCA crimes. MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 29, at 37. In other
words, the recidivism risk for the category containing ACCA is significantly lower than for
other crimes in the same category, suggesting "that assigning offenders to criminal history
category VI, under [ACCA], is for reasons other than their recidivism risk." Id.
32 134 CONG. REC. 15807 (1988).
33 WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 30, see also Sady, supra note 4, at 69 (noting that
sponsors of the bill were influenced by the Wolfgang study).
34 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990).
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[A]s a warning to first time offenders and provide[s] them with an opportunity to
reform ... . [S]anctions become increasingly severe.., not so much that [the]
defendant has sinned more than once as that he is deemed incorrigible when he
persists in violations of the law after conviction of previous infractions.
Representative Wyden stated at the time, "We simply must put a stop to the
career [criminals] .... [W]e all know that a slap on the wrist won't be
enough to deter these criminals. ' 36 Statements made during the course of
approving the 1988 amendment, which added the requirement that prior
convictions carry sentences of greater than one year, further emphasize the
desired scope of ACCA as applicable only to those criminals for whom
rehabilitation had previously proven futile.37 Finally, the title of ACCA
itself can be used as an indicator of congressional intent.
38
Legislative history illustrates the careful deliberation Congress
undertook through the drafting and revision of ACCA in order to ensure a
narrow interpretation of qualifying conduct. A desire to rehabilitate and
defer where possible, and to incapacitate for long periods without the
possibility for parole only in the direst of circumstances, is apparent from
congressional hearings and statements. Furthermore, studies show this
approach of selective incapacitation may be the best approach to dealing
with true career criminals. 39 Yet overly-broad applications of ACCA by
courts continue to foster doubt as to its propriety, effectiveness, and
constitutionality, suggesting the need for a clearer standard.
B. CONTINUED INCONSISTENCY AND DOUBT IN APPLICATION
In evaluating prior convictions to determine their eligibility for use
under ACCA-that is, whether such crime constitutes a "violent
felony° 40-- courts look to two requirements laid out by the statute. First, the
crime must have been one of several enumerated offenses, one involving
35 Crago, supra note 11, at 1194 (citations omitted).
36 Jill C. Rafaloff, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute
or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1091 n.42 (1988) (quoting 130 CONG. REC.
H101551 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984)).
37 134 Cong. Rec. 15807 ("[ACCA reflects] the need to incarcerate unrehabilitative
repeat violent felons for lengthy periods .... It is my view that the only way to deal with
such hardened criminals is with stiff prison terms with no prospect for parole.").
38 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) ("'[T]he title of a
statute and the heading of a section' are 'tools available for the resolution of a doubt' about
the meaning of a statute." (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519,
528-29 (1947))).
39 See generally Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of
Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1982) (discussing various studies evaluating the
effectiveness of selective incapacitation).
40 Though not discussed herein, a prior conviction for a "serious drug offense" would
also qualify. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
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"conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another[,]" or one that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another" 41 (the
"substantive element requirement"). Second, the prior conviction must
have been for a "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of
a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by
imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult" 42 (the "sentencing
requirement").
In the two decades since ACCA's enactment, courts have found an
extremely broad range of seemingly minor offenses 43 to constitute violent
felonies under these two requirements, despite clear congressional intent
that ACCA be reserved for only the most hardened career criminals.44 In
response to the realization that the lack of a bright line standard was
resulting in over-application and inconsistencies among states, the Supreme
Court declared that a "formal categorical approach" must be used in
evaluating the substantive element requirement for each prior conviction.45
However, to reduce the disproportionality of punishment to conduct,
eliminate inconsistencies within and among states, and achieve Congress's
intended goal of selective incapacitation of unrehabilitative career
criminals, a similar standard must be adopted for the evaluation of the
sentencing requirement as well.
1. Taylor's Formal Categorical Approach
The formal categorical approach to defining the elements of a prior
crime for which a defendant was convicted arose out of a need to avoid two
dilemmas: Sixth Amendment concerns and inconsistencies in ACCA
application among states.
In essence, the Taylor formal categorical approach involves evaluating
prior convictions in terms of the generic offense and analyzing whether the
41 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i-ii).
42 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
43 For a discussion of overly broad definitions used to "sweep in far too many crimes that
present a relatively remote risk of the use of physical force or physical injury," see Dyer,
supra note 3, at 376. Crimes that have qualified include tampering with a motor vehicle
(United States v. Bockes, 447 F.3d 1090, 1093 (8th Cir. 2006)); fleeing and eluding (United
States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 2006)); operating a motor vehicle without
the owner's consent (United States v. Lindquist, 421 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2005)); failure
to stop for a blue light (United States v. James, 337 F.3d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 2003)); and
failure to return to a halfway house (United States v. Bryant, 310 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir.
2002)). Dyer, supra note 3, at 379 n.19.
44 See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
45 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990).
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elements of such generic offense exist under the particular state law
definition of that offense, rather than looking to the actual conduct of the
offender.46 As the Taylor court said, "[ACCA] mandates a formal
categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior
offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions., 47 If
the state definition is more broad than the generic offense (meaning that not
all the elements of the generic offense were necessarily met), or if the state
definition criminalizes conduct that would not constitute a part of a
qualifying generic offense (unless the facts available for the sentencing
court's evaluation conclusively established that all elements of the
qualifying offense were met), the prior conviction may not be counted as
one of three qualifying prior convictions under ACCA.48
The formal categorical approach satisfies the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of the right to a jury trial and the Fourteenth Amendment's right
to due process because a sentencing court does not evaluate the prior
conduct of an offender in making its recidivism enhancement
determinations, but rather determines whether all the elements of the
generic offense are present in the state statutory definition of the previous
crime. 49 By doing so, the sentencing court ensures that all of the elements
used to define that offense under ACCA have already been proven to a
jury,5" preventing unconstitutional violations of due process and jury trial
rights that would occur if the court considered facts of the prior conviction
that were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.51
The formal categorical approach also addresses the problem of
inconsistency in ACCA application among states due to definitional
differences in crimes having the same or similar names but varied
requirements. For example, "Although the ACCA includes 'burglary'
among the enumerated violent felonies, Taylor nonetheless established that
46 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599-602.
47 Id. at 560.
48 See United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2001); see
also United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2001) (evaluating the text
of a statute to determine whether a conviction for a particular crime qualified as a predicate
offense); United States v. Casarez-Bravo, 181 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining
that a court must examine the statutory definition of a crime to determine its elements).
41 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599.
50 See Daniel Doeschner, Note, A Narrowing of the Prior Conviction Exception, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 1333, 1338-39 (2006).
51 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."); see also McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986) (looking to legislative history to determine whether
possession of a firearm was intended to be a sentencing factor that a subsequent court could
permissibly consider without violating due process).
2008] 1417
KR YSTLE LAMPRECHT
not all state burglary convictions should be considered predicate felonies
under that Act, as not all state definitions of "burglary" conform to the
accepted generic definition of that crime.53  Courts have generally
considered the generic definition of burglary to have the following
elements: an unlawful or privileged entry into, or remaining in, a building
or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.54 Using this generic
definition avoids a situation in which identical conduct would be classified
as a qualifying predicate offense in one state, but not in another. Using
only state law definitions, theft from a vending machine would qualify as a
predicate burglary offense in Texas, but not in California.55 However, in
Michigan, a predicate burglary offense would never occur, as that state does
not define any crime as "burglary.,
56
Such reliance on state law definitions would create obvious
inconsistencies in the application of ACCA not only among circuits, but
also within them. For that reason, the Taylor Court noted that "absent plain
indication to the contrary, federal laws are not to be construed so that their
application is dependent on state law." 57 However, the Court's approach
fails to solve either of the problems involved in using state definitions,
despite the Court's insistence that a generic approach not dependent on state
law be adopted for analyzing whether prior convictions qualify as one of the
three predicate offenses under ACCA, and despite the Court's attempt to
define a formal categorical approach to accomplish this.
This insufficiency arises because the formal categorical approach
suggested by the Taylor Court only addresses one of the two prongs
involved in an ACCA prior conviction analysis-the substantive elements
requirement. The Taylor Court neglected to consider the other component,
the sentencing requirement. As a result, courts are left in continued reliance
not only on state law, but also on the discretion of previous judges and
52 United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2001).
53 United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1992).
14 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598; see also Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1196 (adopting Taylor's definition
of generic burglary).
" Taylor, 495 U.S. at 591. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 30.01-30.05 (1989 and
Supp. 1990) (including theft from coin-operated machines and receptacles), with CAL. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 459 (West Supp. 1990) (not including theft from coin-operated machines in its
definition of burglary).
56 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 591; see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.110 (1979).
51 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 591-92 ("[I]n the absence of a plain indication of an intent to
incorporate diverse state laws into a federal criminal statute, the meaning of the federal
statute should not be dependent on state law." (quoting United States v. Turley, 352 U.S.
407, 411 (1957)).
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prosecutors,58 in determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as an
ACCA predicate offense. This reliance has resulted in the continued
misapplication of previous convictions, inconsistencies among and within
the circuits, and has failed to ease constitutional concerns regarding
disproportionality, the right to trial by jury, and double jeopardy.
2. Improper Categorization of Prior Convictions for Minor Offenses as
Violent Felonies
Although federal sentencing courts do not consider state law
definitions of "misdemeanor" and "felony" in determining whether a prior
conviction constitutes a "violent felony," 59 relying on the formal categorical
approach to the substantive elements requirement fails to prevent
categorization of minor offenses as violent felonies, resulting in an over-
application of the ACCA recidivist sentencing enhancement. Of particular
concern are those crimes that could conceivably be tried as either felonies
or as misdemeanors, depending on the context of the crime and the choices
of the prosecution. In California, such crimes are known as "wobblers" and
may be charged as either misdemeanors or felonies at the discretion of the
prosecutor, or may be reduced from felony to misdemeanor by the trial
court specifically in an effort to avoid California's "three strikes" law.6°
A problem arises when a recidivism statute elevates some of these
wobblers from the level of misdemeanor to that of felony, with similarly
elevated prison sentences, based on the defendant's prior criminal record.61
Accordingly, a crime that ordinarily would be punishable by a term of less
than one year-therefore escaping being counted under ACCA-may be
elevated to a much longer prison term due solely to the defendant's prior
criminal history.62 As a result, the crime that would ordinarily be ineligible
becomes eligible for use in ACCA enhancement simply because that prior
58 In the case of California's wobblers, a judge or prosecutor can decide whether a
particular offense is charged as a felony or as a misdemeanor. See infra note 60 and
accompanying text. Plea bargaining situations also illustrate this discretion, such as in
United States v. Reeves, where one of the defendant's three prior violent felony convictions
was classified as a felony rather than a misdemeanor at trial because the plea agreement had
provided for such classification. No. CR-05-47-B-W, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45721, at *10
(D. Me. July 5, 2006).
59 United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
a court must look to whether a particular crime meets the definition of "violent felony" under
federal sentencing law rather than relying on the state's label of that crime).
60 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 16-17 (2003) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 17(b)(5), (1) (1999)).
61 Id.




sentence itself has been enhanced beyond one year due to recidivism. The
final effect is that a string of minor offenses is aggregated into a single
criminal unit that can be classified as a "violent felony.,
63
Furthermore, although the formal categorical approach to the
substantive elements requirement does assist in reducing interstate
inconsistencies, the same conduct in different states still often leads to a
different outcome under ACCA because of sentencing variations among
states for the same offense. One such inconsistency surrounds whether a
driving under the influence (DUI) conviction can constitute a "violent
felony" under ACCA. The Supreme Court in Leocal v. Ashcroft found that
a DUI does not constitute a violent felony. 64 Although in Leocal the Court
evaluated the definition of violent felony for purposes of a different statute,
the Immigration and Nationality Act, that statute and ACCA share an
emphasis on requiring a risk of "the use of physical force," suggesting a
level of active, affirmative awareness or intent that does not necessarily
accompany the act of driving while intoxicated.65
Nevertheless, courts are divided as to whether a DUI offense can
constitute one of three prior convictions for violent felonies under ACCA.66
This inconsistency has persisted even with the introduction of the formal
categorical approach to the substantive elements requirement,67 suggesting
63 For example, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003), two petty thefts of videos
from a Kmart store qualified as felonies due to the defendant's prior burglary convictions,
even though each theft totaled less than $100. When charged as felonies, these two theft
incidents violated California's three strikes recidivism statute, counting as two of the
required three offenses. Id. at 67-68. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole for fifty years as punishment for two petty thefts occurring within a
two-week period, simply because of recidivism sentencing enhancements. Id. at 66.
Although Lockyer concerns only the California three strikes law, a similar situation could
arise under ACCA based on the same set of facts and could result in a similarly
disproportionate sentence.
64 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) ("The ordinary meaning of [violent felony],
combined with [the statute]'s emphasis on the use of physical force against another person
(or the risk of having to use such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of
violent, active crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.").
65 Id. (emphasis added). Compare id. with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (requiring
"as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
of another") (emphasis added).
66 See United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 972 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that
Missouri's definition of DUI does not constitute a violent felony). Contra United States v.
Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that while Wisconsin treats a DUI
offense as a misdemeanor, a DUI conviction with a sentence enhanced by recidivism for
previous DUI convictions does qualify as a prior conviction for a violent felony under
ACCA).
67 Taylor was decided in 1990. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). The DUI
debate illustrated by McCall, Sperberg, and Leocal, discussed supra notes 64-66, for
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that courts would benefit from additional guidance in the form of a
sentencing requirement standard.
Enacted with an eye toward increasing consistency on a national level,
such a rule would provide courts with an objective, empirical factor to
consider in addition to the subjective consideration of whether the elements
of the particular offense involve a risk of physical violence and whether, or
how much, intent is required on the part of the offender in relation to that
violence. In cases such as DUI convictions, where courts' confusion has
illustrated that even a formal categorical approach fails to yield a definitive
result, a uniform, consistent sentencing standard that examines whether the
predicate offense had a sentence of greater than or less than one year
maximum imprisonment would provide a second, objective factor for
decision-making.
Another compelling argument for the adoption of a sentencing
requirement standard is to eliminate the use of previous recidivism-
enhanced sentences in the consideration of whether prior convictions
qualify as predicate offenses. The resulting doubly-enhanced sentences are
often so disproportionate to the actual conduct involved in the instant
offense as to appear fundamentally unfair, if not outright unconstitutional.
For example, in United States v. Sperberg, one of the defendant's three
prior convictions qualifying him for sentencing enhancement under ACCA,
a DUI conviction, was only countable because it had previously been
enhanced by a state recidivism statute.68 As a result, a string of
misdemeanor DUI offenses combined to form a violent felony due to
recidivism, eventually leading to Sperberg being labeled a career criminal
and sentenced for nearly twice the maximum amount of time he otherwise
could have received.69 Sperberg's commission of a number of state
misdemeanors, coupled with his attempted theft of lobsters from a local
grocery store,70 seems to fall far short of making him one of "the most
repetitive and violent and dangerous offenders" in America.7'
example, took place in 2003-2005-and has not yet received a definitive resolution from the
Supreme Court.
68 Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 708.
69 Id. at 707 (stating that the maximum sentence for a felon possessing a firearm is 120
months, but that because of his three previous "violent felony" convictions, Sperberg was
sentenced to 210 months).
70 Sperberg's other conviction was for verbally threatening a security guard while
attempting to steal lobster tails from a grocery store. Id. It should be noted that the state
court judge imposed a very lenient penalty for this conviction, as "Sperberg had been too
drunk and high on other drugs to follow through" with his threats. Id. at 708.
71 United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The [ACCA] was so
narrowly drawn to apply to only the most repetitive and violent and dangerous offender, that
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Another example of a previous misdemeanor offense acquiring the
label of violent felony because of a state sentencing enhancement appears in
United States v. Duval.72 In that case, the First Circuit found Duval's prior
conviction for simple assault and battery under Maine law constituted a
violent felony under ACCA,73 even though such crime ordinarily fails
ACCA's test that a violent felony must be "punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year.",74  Because Duval had previously been
convicted of two misdemeanor assaults, his maximum sentence for the third
assault was increased from less than one year to a maximum of five years,75
bringing it within the purview of ACCA's sentencing requirement for prior
convictions.
The Duval court acknowledged that allowing the consideration of
recidivism sentencing enhancements could result in qualification as a career
criminal for having three prior "violent felony" convictions even if the
defendant had only been convicted of two felonies and a misdemeanor
offense.7 6 The court went so far as to use "assault" as its example of a
misdemeanor, the very crime it goes on to label a "violent felony" in
Duval's case.77 Not only did the court seem content with labeling Duval's
misdemeanor offense a violent felony, it also acknowledged that such a
determination goes against the intended purpose of ACCA, that is, that
"ACCA should be applied only to hardened criminals.., who have
committed three (rather than two) crimes whose nature is so serious that
they are punishable as felonies. 78 Further, the court acknowledged that this
final decision, effectively finding that Duval was convicted of "recidivist
assault" rather than "simple assault," relied on reasoning that, while adopted
by the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, created a tension between two
Supreme Court decisions that would otherwise not exist. 79 This tension
carves a seemingly irreconcilable rift between Apprendi v. New Jersey,
which states that elements of an offense must be pleaded and proven to a
a life sentence would be justified in any case that could reasonably be expected to be
prosecuted under the [ACCA]." (quoting S. REP. No. 97-585, at 3 (1982))).
72 United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2007).
73 Id. at 83.
74 Under ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(2) (2007), simple assault and battery is a
"Class D" misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in prison. However, under Maine's
recidivism offender statute, § 1252 (4-A), Duval's misdemeanor was elevated to a "Class C"
offense, increasing the maximum sentence for the same conduct to five years in prison.
Duval, 496 F.3d at 80-81.
71 Id. at 81-82.
76 Id. at 82.
77 Id.
78 id.
71 Id. at 82-83.
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jury,80 and Almendarez-Torres v. United States, which carves out an
exception to the Apprendi rule for prior convictions. 81 Almendarez-Torres
rejected the argument that recidivism creates a separate "recidivist crime"
of which recidivism is an element .
The Duval court's decision to count a conviction for simple assault as
a violent felony due to its recidivism-enhanced sentence resulted in Duval
receiving a sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment,83 a 50% increase over
the maximum sentence he could have received for his offense without
84ACCA's sentencing enhancement. Here again, as in Sperberg, a
conviction for a state law misdemeanor carrying a maximum sentence of
one year or less was enhanced at the state level due to prior misdemeanor
convictions, ultimately earning the defendant the title of career criminal and
resulting in vastly increased penalties for their subsequent federal
convictions.
85
Penalties so far in excess of the maximum sentence ordinarily
available raise once more the constitutionality questions arising out of such
disproportionate sentences.86 The current formal categorical approach fails
to eliminate these questions. A formal categorical approach to sentencing
would have solved the Duval court's dilemma by providing a method of
determining whether ACCA's sentencing requirement was met by Duval's
prior convictions without having to choose whether to consider the state law
recidivist sentencing enhancements. 87  While the formal categorical
approach to the substantive elements requirement has helped to reduce
inconsistencies, constitutional challenges, and the impression of
fundamental unfairness, cases like Duval, Sperberg, and others demonstrate
that additional guidance is necessary.88
80 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
81 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998).
82 Id.; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90 (affirming the reasoning of Almendarez-
Torres).
83 Duval, 496 F.3d at 72.
84 Id. Duval was convicted of a single count of being a felon in possession of a handgun,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). A violation of this Section without sentencing
enhancements carries a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(2) (2006).
85 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 27 (discussing seemingly disproportionate sentences resulting from
recidivism).
87 Although it is questionable whether the Duval court would have used such a standard
even if it had existed, as the court makes no mention or apparent use of the formal
categorical approach to ACCA's substantive elements requirement that has been in existence
since Taylor.
88 See also Thomas W. Hillier, Comparing Three Strikes and the ACCA-Lessons to
Learn, 7 FED. SENT'G. REP. 78, 78 (1994) (asserting that allowing courts to drift away from
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C. A NEW STANDARD FOR PRIOR SENTENCE ANALYSIS UNDER ACCA
1. The Importance of the Sentencing Requirement
In light of the inconsistencies described above, Congress's inclusion of
a second factor to assist in this determination is particularly fortuitous.
89
Creating an objective standard for evaluation of this sentencing requirement
would solve many of the problems that the formal categorical approach to
the substantive elements requirement was intended to resolve, but that have
nonetheless continued to haunt courts for over a decade. 90 These problems
include inconsistencies in application, due process violations, double
jeopardy violations, and an unacceptably high rate of false positives in the
labeling of career criminals.
Each of these problems is particularly apparent in cases where a prior
conviction being considered under ACCA has already received a sentencing
enhancement under a state recidivism statute, which makes the actual
sentence imposed by the state court seem to fall within the scope of
ACCA's sentencing requirement. 9' For example, in Corona-Sanchez, the
court evaluated for applicability as a predicate offense a prior conviction
labeled "Petty Theft with Prior Jail Term for a Specific Offense" by the
state court. 9 2 The trial court had used the actual sentence imposed by the
state court, two years imprisonment, to determine whether such prior
conviction qualified as a predicate offense.93 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
properly reversed this holding because the maximum penalty for petty theft
alone, without the recidivism sentencing enhancement, was only six
the formal categorical approach is a "slippery slope" toward the use of unreliable,
inconsistent information in deciding whether to apply ACCA).
89 In addition to the requirement that a prior conviction constitute a "violent felony,"
such crime must be "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (2006).
90 Taylor was decided in 1990. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Since
then, courts have continued to struggle with, or even dismiss as impossible, the goal of
national uniformity in ACCA's application. See, e.g., United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64,
83 (1st Cir. 2007) (suggesting that national consistency would require additional
congressional action and that perhaps federalism concerns trump national consistency in the
eyes of legislators).
91 United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2001). Although
this case concerns the crime of being a deported alien in the United States in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2000) with possible recidivism enhancement pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(2) instead of concerning ACCA, the court applies ACCA principles and case law
by analogy because the requirement that the predicate offense be punishable by at least one
year is the same in both statutes. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1205, 1217.
92 Id. at 1206.
" Id. at 1208.
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months.94 The court correctly noted that under Taylor's formal categorical
approach, "Petty Theft with Prior Jail Term for a Specific Offense" is
broader than the generic definition of "theft" or "petty theft."95 Therefore,
on its face, Corona-Sanchez's conviction without the recidivism component
would not have qualified as an aggravated felony under federal sentencing
guidelines.96
The Ninth Circuit found that the trial court's consideration of the
previous sentence with the recidivism enhancement attached was improper,
as such enhancement is a mere sentencing factor that "does not relate to the
commission of the offense., 97 In addition to constitutional concerns arising
over the consideration by a sentencing judge of facts not previously proven
to a jury, as is the case with sentencing factors, the Ninth Circuit also
acknowledged the tension created between such considerations and
Congress' goal of ACCA:
Given the profound consequences of the designation and the declared purpose of
Congress to target "serious crimes," it is doubtful that Congress intended to include
crimes such as petty theft within the ambit of the definition by virtue of state
sentencing enhancements imposed for acts that themselves are not aggravated
felonies.
91
Despite the logic of the Corona-Sanchez rule prohibiting the
consideration of recidivist-based sentencing factors imposed on prior
convictions by state courts, the circuits remain split as to whether the actual
sentence of the trial court should be determinative of whether prior
convictions satisfy ACCA's sentencing requirement, or whether some other
standard should be used to evaluate prior sentences. 99 Currently, the First,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits take the Corona-Sanchez approach, removing
recidivist sentence enhancements to evaluate prior convictions, while the
Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have adopted the approach that only the
actual sentence ordered by the trial court can be considered. 00 Although
94 Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West Supp. 1990).
95 Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1207.
96 Id. at 1208.
97 Id. at 1209 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000)); see also
People v. Bouzas, 807 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Cal. 1991) (holding that the same enhancement
provision at issue in Corona-Sanchez's earlier offense "is a sentencing factor for the court
and not a matter for the jury to consider in relation to the present offense on which the
defendant is being tried.").
98 Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1209-10.
99 See, e.g., United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2007) (discussing the
circuit split as to whether a conviction containing a recidivism-enhanced sentence should be
atomized into two separate factors, underlying offense and recidivism enhancement, or




the Supreme Court has found recidivism sentencing enhancements
themselves to be constitutional,' 0' the question remains as to whether the
use of enhancements that do not speak to the conduct of a prior conviction
and that are not proven to a jury in a sentencing court's ACCA evaluation
similarly satisfies constitutional requirements. The answer to this question
appears to be that such consideration is not constitutional, meaning that not
only is such consideration deleterious to the goals of national consistency
and punishment of only the most hardened criminals, it is not even
permissible as a means of evaluating prior convictions. Even though the
prior conviction exception generally satisfies constitutional requirements
for recidivism enhancements, consideration of such enhancements when
evaluating prior convictions to which they have been attached-such as in
Duval and other cases refusing to atomize the sentence enhancement from
underlying offense-essentially treats the recidivism enhancement as an
element of the offense, which would then require proof before a jury.0 2
2. Internal Consistency: Discounting Sentencing Enhancements in Prior
Convictions
Considering recidivism as a sentencing factor rather than an element of
a separate offense may satisfy constitutional concerns, but without an
objective standard for evaluating ACCA's sentencing requirement, issues of
fundamental fairness still arise from inconsistencies within the federal
circuits. Even within a single state, courts may not evaluate two
convictions for the same offense in the same way for ACCA purposes, due
to sentencing enhancements previously applied to those convictions.
Under ACCA's recidivism sentencing enhancement, the requirement
for three predicate offenses is phrased in terms of prior convictions, rather
than in terms of an offender's past conduct. 0 3 The Supreme Court relied
heavily upon this distinction in its holding that ACCA does not violate
101 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
102 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also Rafaloff, supra note
36, at 1097 (establishing that prior convictions must be proven at trial if they are considered
an element of the offense, while sentencing enhancements need only be established at the
sentencing hearing).
103 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) ("[ACCA] mandates a formal
categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not
to the particular facts underlying those convictions."). Although § 924(e) mentions "conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another," 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006), the emphasis is still on the need for "three previous convictions by
any court referred to in § 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug
offense." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (emphasis added).
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constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy or denial of due process.10 4
Nonetheless, without an objective standard for evaluation of ACCA's
sentencing requirement, courts may qualify or disqualify as predicate
offenses prior convictions to which sentencing enhancements have been
previously applied.10 5  These enhancements are often based on the
offender's recidivism or upon the previous sentencing court's exercise of
discretion concerning the degree of harm or level of severity of the
offender's conduct.10 6 By considering these enhancements when deciding
whether to further enhance under ACCA, a court evades the constitutional
requirements explained by the Supreme Court. Instead, the court makes
distinctions among prior convictions for the same offense based on conduct
that has not been proven to a jury, either in its current analysis or in the
course of the trial for the previous offense. 107
In addition to questions of constitutionality, such consideration results
in inconsistent application of ACCA within states. For example, in Duval,
the defendant's prior conviction of simple assault and battery was
considered a qualifying predicate offense under ACCA due to that
conviction's sentence enhancement as a result of previous misdemeanor
assault convictions in Duval's criminal history. 0 8  Another person
convicted of simple assault and battery under circumstances otherwise
identical to those in Duval except for the prior misdemeanor convictions
104 See Doeschner, supra note 50, at 1356 (discussing the three rationales for the prior
conviction exception-that a prior conviction does not have to be proven to a jury: (1)
recidivism is a sentencing factor that speaks only to punishment, not to the crime itself
(articulated in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998)); (2) a
defendant receiving a recidivism-enhanced sentence has already received a jury trial and due
process for each conviction at the time that conviction was received (articulated in Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248-49 (1999)); and (3) the exception for prior convictions does
not create a presumption of guilt (articulated in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87
(1986))).
105 See supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text (discussing various cases in which
recidivism enhancements to prior convictions qualified those convictions for use under
ACCA, when they otherwise would not have met the sentencing requirement).
106 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 256-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[H]arm from a crime-
including whether the crime, after its commission, results in the serious bodily injury or
death of a victim-has long been deemed relevant for sentencing purposes."); see also
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230 (naming recidivism as possibly the most common basis
for sentence enhancement).
107 See United States v. McCaffrey, 437 F.3d 684, 690 (2006) (holding that even after
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), not all sentence enhancements must be proven
to jury beyond a reasonable doubt). Cf Doeschner, supra note 50, at 1334 ("[S]entencing
courts that broadly interpret the prior conviction exception tend to violate the very rationales
that justify it.").




would not have had this conviction counted as a predicate offense. Without
the recidivist enhancement, the maximum penalty allowed for simple
assault and battery in Maine is less than ACCA's minimum sentencing
requirement.10 9 This may not seem inherently unjust considering Duval's
prior convictions were for offenses that carry violent connotations (assault),
but the substance of those prior convictions had no bearing on whether the
state law recidivism enhancement applied. Had Duval's prior convictions
been for a nonviolent misdemeanor, for example, parking violations,"0 the
result would have been the same. 11
Furthermore, such prior state-level enhancements are often for
repeated convictions or conduct that would not qualify under ACCA and to
which ACCA is not designed to apply, such as for misdemeanors, non-
violent conduct, the results of plea bargaining, and the discretion of
prosecutors and judges. "1 2
Despite the inequities obvious in considering recidivism enhancements
in prior convictions, some courts have expressed misgivings about ignoring
them. 113  The reason for this apprehension is that a crime considered a
felony at the state level may be considered a mere misdemeanor under
ACCA, an inconsistency that troubles some courts and commentators."1
4
09 Id. at 80-81 (noting that under ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(2) (2007),
simple assault and battery is a "Class D" misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in
prison).
110 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (citing the example of overtime
parking violations being used for recidivism sentencing enhancements). Although Rummel
stands for the proposition that a life sentence should not result from such violations due to
disproportionality, id. at 288 n. 11, the Duval sentence enhancement at the state level was not
for life, but rather for a maximum of five years, and ACCA only requires that the sentence
be punishable by over one year. Therefore, Duval's sentence could conceivably have been
increased under the Maine recidivism statute for parking violations in such a way so as to
bring such sentence within the scope of ACCA, later subjecting him to fifteen years to life
imprisonment. The same result deemed preposterous by the Rummel Court is therefore
possible under ACCA through the considerations of sentences for prior convictions that have
already been enhanced, without examination of the crimes for which those enhancements
were given.
11l See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(4-A).
112 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 16-17 (2003) (noting that in cases of wobblers,
prosecutors have the discretion to charge an offense as either a misdemeanor or a felony);
Duval, 496 F.3d at 84 (applying recidivism enhancement at state level for prior
misdemeanors); United States v. Fernandez, 121 F.3d 777, 780 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that
state crime of assault may consist of either violent or non-violent conduct); United States v.
Reeves, No. CR-05-47-B-W, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45721, at *10 (D. Me. July 5, 2006)
(recognizing that defendant's prior conviction was tried as a felony due to agreement in plea
bargain).
113 Duval, 496 F.3d at 84.
114 E.g., id. ("It would be unusual if a court could not consider Duval's conviction as a
felony for ACCA when Maine law would recognize it as such for state-law purposes.").
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However, definitional differences are common from state to state and from
state law to federal law.115 It is not immediately obvious why such an
inconsistency between a particular circuit and one of the states contained
therein would be worse than an inconsistency between circuits, or even an
inconsistency within circuits as a result of differences in states' laws inside
that circuit.
The only alternative that courts have to discounting any sentencing
enhancements already applied to prior convictions is to examine the actual
conduct that led to the prior conviction and the actual sentence received.' 
16
However, this would require the sentencing judge to hold a "mini-trial" to
evaluate that prior conduct. No court has allowed the use of this method,
favoring a categorical approach instead.117 Courts' reluctance to deviate
from the formal categorical approach to ACCA's substantive elements
requirement, and the reasons for such apprehension, would apply to the
application of a formal categorical approach to the sentencing requirement
as well. 118 Such a sentencing requirement, which would instruct courts to
discount any prior enhancements to predicate offenses, would result in
even, consistent application of ACCA to offenders who have been
convicted of the same generic offense, but who may have had disparate
maximum sentence possibilities due to factors outside the scope of ACCA.
3. Achieving Nationwide Consistency in A CCA Applicability
The same inconsistency seen within individual states and circuits is
even more pronounced on a national level. This inconsistency arises for
two reasons. First, actual differences in substantive state law vary the
penalties available for a particular offense. " 9 Second, the circuits are split
as to how such state law should be applied or considered in relation to
ACCA. 120  For example, in Maine, simple assault carries a maximum
penalty of less than one year, disqualifying it as a possible predicate offense
115 See infra Part III.C.3.
116 Carlton F. Gunn, Reconsidering Prior Convictions: So Many Crimes, So Little Time:
The Categorical Approach to the Characterization of a Prior Conviction Under the Armed
Career CriminalAct, 7 FED. SENT'G. REP. 66 (1994).
"'7 Id. at 66.
118 See supra Part III.B.1.
119 See Duval, 496 F.3d at 83 (discussing sentencing differences among the states and
their effects on the application of ACCA).
120 Id. at 81-82 (describing a current split in the circuits over whether a recidivism
sentencing component should be atomized from the underlying offense when considering
whether the sentence available would qualify the prior conviction as a predicate offense
under ACCA; the following circuits atomize: First, Ninth, and Eleventh; the following
circuits use the actual sentence imposed: Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh).
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under ACCA.121 In Massachusetts, however, the same conduct would result
in a conviction that does qualify as a predicate offense because
Massachusetts applies a sentence of up to 2.5 years for assault.
1 22
One way courts have tried to justify the existence of this non-
uniformity is by arguing that Congress was aware that such inconsistencies
would arise out of the language they chose to use in ACCA but determined
that federalism concerns outweighed these inconsistencies. 23 While such a
view is certainly convenient and easier to implement, legislative history
suggests otherwise: one of the main goals of having a federal recidivism
sentencing enhancement is to avoid the inconsistencies arising when federal
courts are forced to interpret and apply state law. 124  "In terms of
fundamental fairness, [ACCA] should ensure, to the extent that it is
consistent with the prerogatives of the States in defining their own offenses,
that the same type of conduct is punishable on the Federal level in all
cases."1
25
The Taylor court acknowledged both the need for federal uniformity in
the application of a federal law and the need for states to be able to define
their own offenses.12 6 Taylor's formal categorical approach actually does
not impede federalism goals at all, and a corollary standard for ACCA's
sentencing requirement would be similarly acceptable. States would remain
free to define and apply offenses and sentencing enhancements; ACCA
does not modify or re-define a prior conviction, it merely allows courts to
consider that prior conviction for sentence enhancement purposes during
the course of sentencing a later offense.1
27
While the Taylor approach to establishing national consistency is
sound, the Court did not take this approach far enough to ensure actual
uniformity. In Taylor, the Court violated its own mandate that "absent
plain indication to the contrary, federal laws are not to be construed so that
their application is dependent on state law."'128  The formal categorical
approach the Court provided still left a portion of ACCA dependent on state
law, namely, the sentencing requirement. Applying the Court's formal
121 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207(3) (2006).
122 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A(a) (2008).
123 Duval, 496 F.3d at 83 ("Congress implicitly accepted such inconsistencies in the
application of the ACCA because it was concerned about federalism and wanted to preserve
the state's role in defining, enforcing, and prosecuting essentially local crimes .... ).
124 See H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3665. One of
the rationales for ACCA-type sanctions was the alleviation of the difficulties "encountered
by Federal courts in applying State robbery and burglary laws in Federal prosecutions." Id.
125 S. REP. No. 98-190, at 20 (1983).
126 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 582 (1990).
127 Id.
121 Id. at 591-92.
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approach to the sentencing requirement as well as the substantive elements
requirement would achieve the national uniformity that the Taylor Court
desired, but that was never satisfactorily realized.1 29  Currently, in
evaluating a prior conviction under ACCA, a court has no guidance as to
how to analyze whether that prior conviction satisfies ACCA's sentencing
requirement. Some courts look to the actual sentence given by the state
court, while others look to the state law's maximum penalty for the
particular offense without any enhancements for prior convictions. 30  In
either case, the court depends on state law, a reliance that is inherently
detrimental to nationwide consistency.1
3 1
Some courts have posited that the only possible solution to this
dilemma is congressional amendment of ACCA.132 However, Congress has
already provided a two-pronged test for evaluating prior convictions
independent of state law. 33  The first prong, the substantive elements
requirement, has been clarified by Taylor's formal categorical approach.
The second prong, the sentencing requirement, could be used in its current
form and without additional congressional action, in conjunction with the
substantive elements requirement, to make prior conviction analysis under
ACCA completely independent of state law. 34 Accomplishing this requires
the creation of an equivalent formal standard for the sentencing
requirement. Furthermore, to resolve confusion among the circuits, a
formal standard for evaluating ACCA's sentencing requirement must
indicate whether state sentencing law or a new, generic source of sentencing
standards should set the guideline; and whether the actual sentence imposed
by the trial court should be considered, as opposed to the allowable range
without any sentencing enhancements that may have been available.
4. Avoiding False Positives to Maximize ACCA Effectiveness and Achieve
Congress 's Stated Goals
A final reason to create a formal approach to the sentencing
requirement of ACCA is to maximize ACCA's effectiveness at achieving
129 See supra Part III.C.2 (citing examples of non-uniformity even after Taylor).
130 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (describing the current circuit split
regarding consideration of prior sentencing enhancements).
131 See, e.g., United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2007).
132 See Duval, 496 F.3d at 84 ("If Congress finds fault in the pattern of inconsistent
sentences mandated by the ACCA, it is within its power to amend it.").
133 See supra notes 41-42 (defining the "substantive elements requirement" and the
"sentencing requirement" of ACCA).
134 Or, if not completely independent of state law, the analysis would at least apply state
law in a more, if not completely, consistent manner nationwide.
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its stated purpose of incapacitating only society's worst criminals who have
repeatedly proven themselves unresponsive to attempts at rehabilitation. 1
35
While the sentencing requirement may seem at first glance to be far
removed from any standard of predicting recidivism, studies actually
suggest otherwise. 136 Emphasizing the length of imprisonment as one way
to narrow the scope of qualifying predicate convictions could actually result
in far fewer "false positives" than the current system.' 37 Rather than being
an arbitrary threshold, length of imprisonment is actually correlated to the
risk of future recidivism: criminals with prior convictions for crimes that
carry smaller sentences statistically have a lower risk for future
recidivism.'
38
Therefore, when evaluating whether prior convictions demonstrate
such a high risk of recidivism as to necessitate the label of career criminal,
the sentencing requirement gains critical importance. Any convictions
punishable by less than one year do not suggest a high rate of recidivism
and should not be used to identify the convicted person as a career
criminal. 139  Prior convictions with artificially enhanced sentences that
bring them within the scope of ACCA-even though the crime itself would
ordinarily warrant a "small sentence"--means that offenders who are at a
very low risk of recidivism become grouped with true career offenders,
resulting in decreased deterrent effect, 140 inefficacy,' 41 and contravention of
congressional intent. 1
42
135 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
136 See generally MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 29 (discussing the relationship
between sentence length and recidivism).
137 See Sady, supra note 4, at 70 (suggesting that ACCA is so "loosely written" and
unnecessarily broad that reaching a result consistent with its purpose is the exception rather
than the rule). Subsequent amendments have helped to narrow ACCA in the ways Sady
suggests, but courts' application continues to suffer the problems mentioned.
138 MEASURING REcIDIVISM, supra note 29, at 14.
139 id.
140 In other words, an overly broad interpretation of ACCA requirements results in
uncertainty as to what constitutes a triggering event. Foreseeability is a prerequisite to
deterrence, for a criminal cannot be deterred from something of which they have no
knowledge.
141 MEASURING REcIDIVISM, supra note 29, at 37; see also supra note 31 (citing statistics
showing those labeled recidivists under ACCA are actually at a much lower risk for
recidivism than others grouped in the same criminal history category).
142 See, e.g., United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 682 (3d Cir. 1989) ("These are the
people who have demonstrated, by virtue of their definition, that locking them up and letting
them go doesn't do any good. They go on again, you lock them up, you let them go, it
doesn't do any good, they are back for a third time. At that juncture we should say, 'That's
it; time out; it is all over. We, as responsible people, will never give you the opportunity to
do this again."' (citing Armed Career Criminal Act: Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before
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D. SOURCE OF SENTENCING STANDARDS
Having established the need for a formal standard for application of
ACCA's sentencing standard, the question remains as to where courts
should look for a uniform source of sentencing guidelines for use in
evaluating whether a prior conviction satisfies ACCA's sentencing
requirement. Unlike the formal categorical approach to the substantive
elements requirement, 143 the sentencing standard cannot arise out of the
common law or some generic definition. While the common law does
provide elements of a generic offense, such as the generic offense of
burglary, 144 no such generic or common law sentence for burglary exists.
145
Available penalties for a given offense are established by law or sentencing
guidelines at either the state or federal level. While there are advantages
and disadvantages to both state and federal sentencing standards, the ideal
solution to the problems plaguing courts in application of ACCA compels a
federal source of sentencing.
1. State Law Sentences: A Simpler, but Incomplete, Solution
The simplest, but ultimately imperfect, standard for ACCA's
sentencing requirement would be to evaluate sentences for prior convictions
in terms of the maximum sentence available for that conviction under state
law, without any additional sentencing enhancements. This is the approach
taken in Corona-Sanchez, where the court held that the recidivism
enhancement must be separated from the underlying offense. 146 As a result
of discounting all prior sentence enhancements applied to prior convictions,
the scope of ACCA would be much narrower. 147 The only crimes that
the Subcomm. On Crime of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1984) (statement of Stephen Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division))).
143 See United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 2001)
(describing two methodologies employed to define the generic offense under the formal
categorical approach: if a traditional, common law crime exists for a particular offense, the
prior conviction is defined "in terms of its generic, core meaning"; if no traditional common
law crime exists, the plain meaning of the statutory words are used).
144 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (declaring the elements of
generic crime of burglary to include "an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in,
a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime").
145 See Fisher, supra note 8, at 874 & n.41 (describing Massachusetts law in the early
nineteenth century: "Excepting only those very serious crimes that carried mandatory life or
death sentences, none of the typical common-law offenses called for a minimum sentence").
146 Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1210.
147 A narrow reading of the prior conviction exception allows the court only to consider
the fact of the existence of the prior conviction itself instead of any facts that may be
incidental to that conviction. Doeschner, supra note 50, at 1371-72. The only
determinations of fact the court must then make are that the prior conviction exists and that it
belongs to the defendant. Id.
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would qualify as predicate offenses are those that states consider
sufficiently severe as to merit large sentences on their own, without regard
to past criminal history or other enhancement criteria.
148
Such a standard, if implemented on a national level, would reduce
many of the problems currently plaguing the application of ACCA. First,
apparent disproportionality of sentencing would be reduced because
convictions for minor offenses would not trigger ACCA enhancement,
regardless of prior sentence enhancements. Second, inconsistencies within
states and among circuits resulting from differing state law sentence
enhancements and prosecution choices would be lessened, as convictions
for a certain offense would always receive the same treatment regardless of
previous choices by prosecutors and judges. Third, the rate of false
positives would be lower because minor offenders would not experience
random lightning strikes of ACCA liability. Finally, Congress's goal of
applying ACCA enhancements to only the very worst felons would be more
closely achieved.
However, although this formal approach to the sentencing requirement
would partially solve many of the problems inherent in ACCA's current
application, consideration of the maximum sentence available under state
law for a particular offense is not a complete solution to one of the most
critical issues: reliance upon state law. 149  Because of this persisting
problem, consideration of state sentence ranges as a formal approach to the
sentencing requirement is not a viable solution at all. Although providing
slightly more guidance to courts in interpretation of the sentencing
requirement than was provided by Taylor, the ultimate result still violates
the rationale behind'Taylor's formal categorical approach. 1
50
Furthermore, even though a standard prohibiting consideration of
sentence enhancements unrelated to the underlying offense would make
ACCA's application more foreseeable,' 51 the inconsistencies that would still
arise between states and within circuits would continue to impede any
deterrent effect. In order to avoid falling within the scope of ACCA, an
offender would have to take into account location of each offense and the
varying laws existing in each jurisdiction, rather than simply being aware of
ACCA itself.'52
148 See, e.g., Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1209 (describing felonies "with reference to
the offense, rather than separate sentencing enhancements").
149 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the need for independence from
state law in application of federal law).
150 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
151 See discussion of random (lightning bolt) applicability, supra note 4.
152 In addition to variations among states, the problems of wobblers would still exist
under this standard because the federal sentencing court is still looking to state law for
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2. Uniform Source of Sentencing Guidelines: One National Source
Because of the problems existing with a state-law-dependent standard
of ACCA's sentencing requirement,153 a uniform, national standard
completely independent of state law is the only true solution. Only then
could the standard for the sentencing requirement be on par with the formal
categorical approach to the substantive elements requirement. 154 However,
since there is no generic source of sentencing under the common law for
specific offenses,155 the final question is where this federal source of
sentencing standards can be found.
One possibility would be to utilize a national average of the maximum
sentences allowable for a given crime. This approach is consistent with
Taylor and allows for the determination of a generic sentence in addition to
the generic elements of an offense. 11 6  Furthermore, the Taylor court
suggested that such a national survey of state laws is actually what
Congress may have had in mind when it drafted the ACCA requirements. 1
57
While such a source of maximum penalties would provide a nationally
uniform standard, consistent application, a narrow scope of qualifying
convictions, and avoidance of constitutional concerns related to the use of
sentencing enhancements in evaluation of prior convictions, there may be
some degree of discomfort or question of practicability regarding the actual
implementation of such a standard by federal courts.158  To address this
issue, such national averages could be promulgated by, or used in tandem
with other materials currently provided by, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, which already provides sentencing guidelines for use by
federal courts. 1
5 9
determining eligibility under the federal law; see, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-
31 (2003) (applying California's three strikes law, rather than ACCA, but with the same
result that a wobbler constitutes one of three prior felony convictions).
153 See supra Part III.D. 1.
154 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588-89 (1990) (discussing the need for a
generic definition of the offense that is not dependent upon state definitions).
155 See supra note 145.
156 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598.
157 Id. ("Congress meant by 'burglary' the generic sense in which the term is now used in
the criminal codes of most States." (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 45 (1979);
United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289 (1969))). If Congress meant the definition of
crimes enumerated in ACCA should be determined using a national average, it follows that
the sentences for such crimes should also arise from a similarly uniform source.
1s The Taylor Court did not seem bothered by this question of practicability, suggesting
that definitions of crimes could be determined by national averages. Maximum penalties,
being numerical, are in fact much more conducive to averaging than the elements of an
offense would be. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598.
159 See U.S. SENTENtING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2007).
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The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) are, in fact, the second
possible source of uniform, determinate sentencing ranges. Promulgated by
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the USSG were designed to address many
of the issues currently facing sentencing analysis of prior convictions under
ACCA, including "disparity in sentencing, certainty of punishment, and
crime control." 160 Although originally intended as a source of guidance to
courts for use in actually sentencing offenders for certain crimes, the USSG
could also be used as a guideline under ACCA to define sentencing ranges
for prior convictions. In effect, the USSG would provide an ideal, uniform
set of standards even more objective, and just as generic, as the formal
categorical approach is for the substantive elements requirement. 161  A
federal sentencing court could evaluate each prior conviction to determine
whether its maximum sentence meets ACCA's sentencing requirement by
calculating the sentencing range for that conviction's "generic offense"
under the USSG, using the base offense level and any increases related to
the elements of that offense.
For example, assault is one offense where ACCA applicability is a
"close call," and the maximum penalty varies greatly from state to state. 162
Under the USSG, minor assault has a base offense level of 7,163 which is
then mapped onto the USSG Sentencing Table and combined with the
offender's Criminal History Category to determine the sentence range,
given in months. 164 Under the USSG, a career criminal can be assigned to
criminal history category VI regardless of the number of previous
convictions, 165 which would result in a sentence range for minor assault of
fifteen to twenty-one months. This would be well within the acceptable
range under ACCA's sentence requirement, meaning that any conviction for
minor assault, regardless of state definitions or sentencing ranges, and
regardless of previous enhancements to that particular conviction, qualifies
as a predicate offense under ACCA.
However, studies have shown the automatic categorization in category
VI to be overly harsh, resulting in a high level of false positives-that is,
160 OFFICE OF PUBLISHING AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2005),
http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf.
161 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005) ("Congress'[s] basic goal in
passing the Sentencing Act was to move the sentencing system in the direction of increased
uniformity.").
162 See supra notes 120-23 (discussing variance among states in maximum penalties
available for assault convictions).
163 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.3(a)(1).
164 See id. ch. 5, pt. A.
165 MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 29, at 37.
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encompassing those who are not "true" recidivists.166 Therefore, a better
approach would be to determine which prior convictions the offender had at
the time in order to place him or her in a criminal history category, rather
than automatically placing him or her in category VI. Under this method,
criminals with three or fewer "criminal history points" would not have a
minor assault qualify as a predicate offense under ACCA, but all others
would.
Yet another approach would be to remove the recidivism factor from
the sentencing table entirely, which would result in classification of minor
assault as a "Zone A" offense, with a sentence of zero to six months.
1 67
Therefore, a minor assault conviction would never qualify as a predicate
conviction under ACCA. Given the problems arising from double-
consideration of recidivism, this may be the best approach to evaluation
using the USSG.
Regardless of the method used to determine an offender's criminal
history category, the USSG is an existing, uniform source of sentencing
guidelines that courts can use to evaluate whether an offender's prior
convictions satisfy ACCA's sentencing requirement. Guidelines for any
crimes that are not already defined by the USSG could be created either




A national standard for application of the sentencing requirement
would solve many, if not all, of the problems currently plaguing ACCA.
This standard should discount any sentencing enhancements previously
applied to prior convictions, and should allow consistent evaluation of
convictions at the national level, independent of variance in state law.
While the easiest way to evaluate prior sentences would be merely to
consider the maximum penalty allowable for a given offense under state
law, less any state-law sentencing enhancements, such a standard presents
the same dilemma the Taylor Court tried to avoid: dependence on state
law. 169 Therefore, a better source of national sentencing guidelines must be
identified.
166 Id.
167 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A.
168 See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (listing the duties and procedural
requirements of the Sentencing Commission in promulgating guidelines).
169 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 591-92 (1990) ("[I]n the absence of a plain
indication of an intent to incorporate diverse state laws into a federal criminal statute, the
meaning of the federal statute should not be dependent on state law." (quoting United States
v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957)).
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This single, uniform source could come from national averages of
sentence ranges currently existing in the criminal codes of most states, or
from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. In either case, such a source
would allow courts to consistently apply ACCA's requirements on a
national level and with a narrow scope, reducing disproportionality in
sentencing, increasing the deterrent effectiveness of ACCA, and
accomplishing Congress's goal of selective incapacitation of the worst,
most unrehabilitative career criminals.
